

Making sense of multiple trade politics: explaining European Union trade policy making in the Doha round

by Arlo Poletti

1. Introduction

The starting point of the analysis developed in this article is an empirical observation: trade politics increasingly vary not only across states, but also within states. While traditionally trade politics was characterized by relatively stable patterns of interaction between a small and selected circle of trade officials and producers seeking either increased access to foreign markets or protection from foreign competitors, this is no longer the case. Over the past twenty years the nature of international trade has changed in terms of both content and process as a result of the evolution of the World Trade Organization (WTO) into a forum for international regulatory harmonization in areas such as services, intellectual property rights, investments, technical standards and food safety, and animal health issues, as well as of the increased bindingness of trade rules brought about by the replacement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)'s model of political-diplomatic dispute settlement with a quasi-judicial model of dispute settlement.

The increased scope and bindingness of trade rules brought about new uncomfortable trade-offs and created incentives for new constituencies to mobilize, thus making the trade policy-making environment more complex and politicized. Not only new societal actors such as environmental and developmental Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have entered the scene alongside other business and societal groups demanding regulation in diverse domains of public policy, but the ideational context within which trade policy decisions are processed has become more contested from a normative standpoint. As a result, we observe that the political processes through which individual states define trade policy strategies varies considerably.

The way the European Union (EU) has come to shape its position in the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations represents one of the most prominent examples of this trend. Scholarly analyses of the EU's involvement

in the Doha round point to a complex trade policy making environment that can hardly be explained through theories that describe a singular and stable pattern of trade politics. For instance, theories that conceive of governments' choices as a result of the pressures of organized societal groups seem to do a good job when it comes to accounting for how the EU negotiated in the areas of agriculture, non-agricultural market access and services (Dür 2008), and trade-and environment (Poletti and Sicurelli 2012). Yet, business groups have been largely indifferent with respect to the EU's attempts to include the so-called Singapore issues in the Doha agenda, lending support to theories that ascribe independent causal effects to the preferences of policy makers (Poletti 2012).

In addition, we observe that the types of goals and motivations guiding actors in the EU trade policy making arena also vary considerably across issue areas. While in some situations societal groups and policy makers know exactly what their interests are and behave strategically to achieve them, in other instances these actors' behavior seems to reflect their values, causal beliefs and normative positions. For example, the EU strongly supported the «development» dimension of the Doha round, sided with developing countries on key matters such as access to medicines in Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) negotiations and, more generally, showed to be quite responsive to the concerns of a wide array of organized societal actors pursuing value-based agendas (Young and Peterson 2006).

How can this complexity be made sense of? What explains variation in patterns of EU trade politics in these negotiations? In this article, I contend that answering these questions requires devising a comprehensive theory or framework encompassing multiple types of politics and allowing to identify the conditions under which these vary. As Yee (2004, 487) notes, when policy making *within* political entities occurs through a complex composite of multiple and shifting modes of governance, relying on theories that describe singular and stable patterns of policy-making severely limits our ability to grasp and account for such empirical phenomena.

As a first step, I identify analytical categories to organize the complex reality of EU trade politics into a conceptually coherent range of finite trade politics types. To do so, I adopt an original approach that combines two conceptual dimensions of variation: configurations of state-society relations and logic of action driving actors' behavior in the EU trade policy making process. I identify four trade politics types reflecting the interaction of these two dimensions: pressure politics, executive politics, civil politics and deliberative politics.

In a second stage, the article develops general and testable hypotheses to account for variation across these trade politics types. To do so, I develop a theoretical framework that builds on the «policies determine politics» argu-

ment, namely on a set of hypotheses positing that the characteristics of the policy issue at stake are causally related to patterns of trade politics (Lowi 1972). More specifically, I contend that the configurations of state-society relations and the logic of action guiding actors' behavior in trade policy making depend, respectively, on the degree to which a policy issue is politically salient and on the extent to which the distributional implications of such an issue can be calculated by the relevant stakeholders.

In the empirical sections, I test the plausibility my argument by drawing on evidence concerning EU domestic politics dynamics in the following negotiations of the Doha round: agriculture, trade-and-competition, trade-and-environment and Technical Assistance and Capacity Building (TACB).

Besides offering an explanation for how and why patterns of EU trade politics vary in international trade negotiations, two important implication of the argument proposed in this article deserve attention. First, the theoretical framework proposed represents the first attempt to develop a coherent set of hypotheses to simultaneously account for variation along two dimensions of variation in EU trade politics. The bulk of existing scholarly analyses on EU trade policy focus either on the conditions under which we can observe different patterns of state-society relations (Ugur 1988; Dür 2010), or on developing hypotheses concerning the logic of action guiding actors (Niemann 2004). The few studies where both dimensions have been taken into consideration offer a significant contribution at the conceptual level, but tend to leave the question of causation unanswered (see Peterson and Bomberg 1999; Young 2007). This article thus offers an original contribution to the literature on EU trade politics by trying and developing a coherent framework to address both questions simultaneously.

Second, this article implicitly subscribes to the view that concepts and theories used to study politics and policies at the national level can be applied for the analysis of the EU policy processes (Hix 1999; Richardson 2001; Yee 2004). All too often studies on EU trade policy have adopted a *sui-generis* approach, exclusively focusing on the unique and peculiar characteristics of the EU's trade policy making system (see for instance, Smith 2001; Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2006). This is an understandable tendency. The EU is probably one of the most original existing political systems and is characterized by a unique set of institutional rules and systems of representation. Yet, this approach has largely resulted in the development of *ad-hoc* accounts of EU trade policy, undermining the possibility to draw on, and contribute to broader political science debates (Poletti and De Bièvre 2013). By drawing on conceptual and theoretical tools from the wider political science literature, this article shows that studying the European Union does not necessarily mean casting oneself away from broader political science debates.

2. The dependent variable: integrating the «whom» and the «how» of European Union trade politics

The observation that the political processes through which EU defines trade policy strategies in negotiations varies a great deal calls for an effort to try and identify analytical categories to organize such complex empirical reality into a conceptually coherent range of finite trade politics types. What are the relevant dimensions of variation of such multiple types of trade politics in the EU? A preliminary effort of classification is necessary before proceeding to develop hypotheses in order to account for such variation. To do so, I adopt an original approach that combines two conceptual dimensions of variation to classify trade politics types: configurations of state-society relations and logic of interaction among the actors involved in the trade policy making process.

In relation to the first dimension, I distinguish between two types of trade politics: society-centered and state-centered. Theories about trade politics usually seek to ascertain the conditions under which different actors dominate, or at least influence, the trade policy making process. Interest groups, non-governmental organizations, parties, trans-national actors, policy makers and international agents have all been pointed at as relevant actors in the trade policy making process in the current international trade regime. At the highest level of abstraction two policy-making models underlie these theories: society-centered and state-centered (Oatley 2009). A society-centered approach essentially argues that governments' trade policy choices are shaped by politicians' responses to pressures emanating from organized societal groups. In this approach, state institutions are merely treated as an instrument employed by individuals or groups as a way of achieving private ends.

State-centered approaches, instead, conceive of policy-makers' preferences as independently determined from societal pressures. According to this view, states' agenda is not reducible to the demands that emerge within the private sphere. Not only national executives and interest groups have conflicting goals and compete with each other over political outcomes but the former have the capacity to act independently from the latter. In this case the causal flow is reversed. While in a society-centered view this runs from private/societal preferences through organized political demands to the state, state-centered theories place policy-makers' agenda at the beginning of the causal chain.

EU trade politics types can be further distinguished depending on the logic guiding actors in the EU trade policy making process. As the ideational context of EU trade politics has become more contested, questions concerning how actors behave have become prominent in the EU trade policy literature. Two types of EU trade politics can be distinguished along this dimension: one characterized by strategic interactions among rational and goal-oriented

actors and one in which rule-guided behavior dominates policy-making. While in the first case actors define their preferences according to a logic of consequentiality – their behavior is driven by preferences and expectations about consequences, reflecting an attempt to make outcomes fulfill subjective desires – in the second such preferences are defined according to a logic of appropriateness – actors seek to fulfill the obligations encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political community or group, and the ethos, practices and expectations of its institutions (March and Olsen 1989). As Risse (2000) notes, this latter logic of action also encompasses also argumentative interactions, namely situation in which rule-guided behavior stems from a conscious process whereby actors have to figure out the situation in which they act.

It is important to note that the distinction between state-centered and society-centered types of trade politics cuts across the distinction between strategic and rule-guided behavior. Socio-cultural bonds, preferences and identities can be formed outside of politics and prior to political interaction or through interaction and political activities in a given institutional sphere (March and Olsen 1998). Essentially, this argument suggests that the dichotomy society-centered and state-centered can also be usefully applied to distinguish different patterns through which ideational factors influence actors' preferences. In some cases, shared ideas, cultural bonds and cognitive scripts are formed within society and then affect how policy makers come to see the world and how they choose among different courses of action available to them. In other cases, ideational factors come to affect the way policy makers' define their preferences insofar as they are encapsulated and embedded in formal and informal institutions within which this actors operate.

This means that society-centered and state-centered types of trade politics can be distinguished depending on the logic that drives actors in the policy making process. We thus can identify society-centered types of trade politics characterized by strategic behavior of actors, as well as by rule-guided behavior. The former type of trade politics typically underlies theoretical approaches, i.e. endogenous trade theory and the theories that have built on it, positing that the trade policy orientation of governments is determined by the anticipated distributional implications of expected policies and the patterns of interest groups mobilization these engender (Schattschneider 1935; Milner 1988; Frieden 1991). The latter type of trade politics instead, underlies approaches that highlight how societal actors can act as carriers of new ideas, values and principles about the conduct of trade policy (Drake and Nicolaïdis 1992).

Similarly, we can distinguish between state-centered types of trade politics characterized by strategic behavior of actors, and by rule-guided behavior of actors. The former type of trade politics is usually depicted by theoretical

approaches stressing the role of agency autonomy in the formulation of trade policy (Gilligan 1997; Meunier 2005). The latter type of trade politics is typically described by theories that focus on how values embedded in institutions either reflect a bias that is crucial in defining what can be considered as a legitimate claim (Goldstein 1988; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Knodt 2004) or foster argumentative and deliberative behavior (Niemann 2004).

To sum up, I identify four types of trade politics reflecting the interaction of both the configuration of state-society relations and logic driving actors' preferences dimensions of variation (see Table 1).

TAB. 1. *Trade politics types.*

		Actors' behavior	
		Strategic	Rule-guided
Configurations of state-society relations	State-centered	Executive politics	Deliberative politics
	Society-centered	Pressure politics	Civil politics

3. Explaining variation across European Union trade politics types

Having constructed a typology of trade politics I now turn to the problem of how to account for variation across these types. Building on a large body of institutionalist trade policy literature a wide array of EU trade policy scholars have inquired into how domestic institutions in the EU affect patterns of trade politics along both the dimensions of variation considered here. Regarding the question of different configurations of state society-relations, some authors have argued that the multilevel and complex nature of the EU's institutional structure allows «agents» to play an autonomous role in shaping EU trade policy preferences (Gerlach 2006; Woll 2006). Focusing on the type of logic guiding actors in the EU trade policy making process, other authors have stressed the role played by intrinsic values embedded in the EU's institutional system in the conduct of trade policy (Falke 2005; Kerremans and Orbie 2008) and argued that high levels of institutionalization and socialization foster argumentative and deliberative behavior in EU trade policy (Niemann 2004; Van den Hoven 2004).

While these institutionalist arguments are very useful for comparative research designs aimed at highlighting systematic differences between trade politics dynamics in the EU and other political systems, they are of little help for a comparative design that seeks to shed light on trade politics variation

within the EU. To be sure, analyses of how different decision making rules in the EU affect trade policy outcomes exist, particularly with regards to EU behavior in trade disputes (Daubjerg and Swinbank 2008). Yet, these approaches are again of little use when it comes to shedding light on EU trade politics variation in multilateral trade negotiations as in these negotiations there is no significant variation in decision making rules across issue areas. Indeed, there is a consolidated political understanding and practice in the EU that in comprehensive multilateral negotiations WTO a final agreement inclusive of all negotiated issues is adopted by consensus.¹

A possible way out of the problems institutionalist arguments have in dealing with the research question addressed here is to build on the so-called «policy determined politics» approach (Lowi 1972). Issue characteristics themselves provide incentives and constraints to which actors respond, both when it comes to decide whether and how to mobilize and with regards to the way they define their preferences.

Issue characteristics and the «how» of the trade politics

The debate between rational-choice and constructivism has often taken the shape of a meta-theoretical confrontation, thus consigning a potentially rich debate to the purgatory of incompatible epistemologies (Goldstein and Keohane 1993). However, this it is gaining widespread acceptance that actors usually combine several modes of interaction, leading to increased attention being devoted to assessing how far one can push one logic of action to account for observable practices and under which conditions one logic dominates a given situation (Risse 2000, 3).

Drawing on existing literature, I derive the expectation that whether the actors involved in the policy-making process can calculate the expected distributional consequences of the alternative policy options available to them matters for the logic of action that will guide them in such process. Goldstein and Keohane (1993, 13-16), for instance, suggest that ideas serve the purpose of guiding behavior under conditions of uncertainty by stipulating causal patterns or by providing compelling ethical or moral motivations for action. Haas (1992, 13-15) argues that epistemic communities may act as channels ideas from societies to governments when general knowledge for assessing the expected outcomes of different courses of action is not available. In the same vein, Young (1989, 362) contends «a person faced with constitutional choice and that remains uncertain as to what his position will be under separate

¹ While in the Treaty of Lisbon states that all key aspects of external trade come under EU exclusive competence, consensus will remain the basis for decisions in the Council of Ministers. See Woolcock (2010) for an extensive discussion on this point.

choice options, will tend to agree on arrangements that might be called fair in the sense that patterns of outcomes generated under such arrangements will be broadly acceptable regardless of where the participant might be located in such outcomes». Scholars investigating how actors' preferences may change as a result of argumentative interaction also suggest that uncertainty of interests and/or lack of knowledge about the situation among actors is a key factor enabling argumentative persuasion and policy deliberation (Risse 2000; Checkel 2001a). Finally, A similar line of reasoning informs sociological institutionalist studies that focus on how ideas, values and norms embedded in a given institutional setting come to shape policy makers preferences either through processes of learning, persuasion and socialization (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Checkel 2001b) or acting as focal points and road maps by defining what can be considered a legitimate claim when different policy options are available to policy makers (Goldstein 1988).

Other arguments on the causal mechanisms that link issue characteristics and the logic of actors' action exist have been put forward in the literature. It has been argued, for instance, that the degree of «importance» of an issue also matters, suggesting that substantive stakes invite rational calculations while relatively low stakes allow for non-calculative decisions-making (Jupille *et al.* 2003). Yet, it seems fair to argue that the degree of certainty about distributive effects is a more «objective» property of an issue than its «stakes», as the latter may depend on subjective perceptions of the actors. In addition while actors may be more prone to engage in rational calculations when substantive stakes are discussed it is unclear how they could do so in the absence of a clear understanding of the cost-benefit structures of alternative policy options. Similarly, actors are likely to act strategically to achieve their preferred policy outcome if the stakes are low but easily discernible.

In sum, I argue that whether the gains and losses of alternative policy decisions can be quantified more compellingly helps accounting for which logic of action will drive actors' behavior. More specifically, I hypothesize that high issue certainty elicits strategic behavior and low issue certainty fosters rule-guided behavior.

Issue characteristics and the configurations of state-society relations

As argued above, a large amount of studies use institutionalist arguments to explain variation in configurations of state-society relations. Yet, institutional variables account only for variation across states. Focusing on issue characteristic helps overcoming this problem and developing general propositions of how such configurations vary both across and within states.

The seminal works of Mancur Olson and others have demonstrated that when a policy entails concentrated rather than diffuse distributional

implications groups face less collective action problems and can therefore more easily mobilize to try and influence policy makers (Olson 1965; Wilson 1973). This basic theoretical insight has gained widespread applicability in the trade policy literature, including the EU trade policy literature, showing that trade policies with concentrated distributional implications create compelling incentives for interest groups to mobilize politically, thereby increasing their ability to influence policy-makers.² While these studies do not explicitly tackle the question of state autonomy, the obvious corollary of this line of argumentation is that policies entailing concentrated distributive effects increase the likelihood that policy-makers will be constrained by societal pressures. Of course, the dynamics of interest groups political mobilization can take different shapes, confrontational or collusive for instance, depending on whether these distributional effects impact on one or more groups as well as on whether both gains and losses affect different groups simultaneously. In light of the conceptual dimension considered here, however, these differences are somehow irrelevant. What matters in this context is the extent to which policy-makers have to respond to bottom-up pressures in the formulation of their trade strategies.

Whether an issue is salient to the mass public also matters. Diffuse interests may succeed in overcoming collective action problems they face and constrain policy-makers when highly salient issues are at stake (Mahoney 2007). In addition, issues are more likely to be made a priority by parties when these are highly salient to the electorate (Verdier 1994; Smith 2000). In other words, issue salience creates an environment in which societal pressures increase and, consequently, decision makers' ability to pursue autonomous preferences decreases.

As both interest groups' propensity to mobilize politically and the broader electorate's orientation represent a constraining/enabling factor for policy makers' capacity to pursue autonomous policy preferences, I construct a concept that encompasses both phenomena. These two sets of arguments can be synthesized with the concept of political salience, which can be broadly defined as the degree to which societal actors perceive that their interests are threatened or opportunities are presented by political discussions concerning a given policy issue. High political salience thus describes any situation in which a trade policy deals with issues that entail concentrated costs or are salient to the mass public, or both. Whenever the political salience of an issue is high I expect societal pressures to be sustained and, consequently,

² Endogenous trade theory is the obvious example of the application of collective action theory to the study of trade policy. For examples of the application of the logic of collective action to the study of EU trade policy see, De Bièvre and Dür (2005); Dür (2010); Eckhardt (2011).

the ability of policy-makers to pursue their preferred agenda low. In this scenario, trade politics will be of a society-centered type. Conversely, when the perceived political salience of an issue is low, I expect policy-makers to face low pressures from society and to enjoy ample discretion in the range of policies they can successfully pursue. In this case, trade politics will be of a state-centered type.

Issue characteristics and politics types

The above hypotheses on the causal mechanisms that link issue-characteristics and politics dynamics allow me to sketch out the following theoretical framework (see Table 2).

TAB. 2. *Theoretical framework linking issue characteristics and trade politics types.*

Political salience of the issue and configurations of state-society relations	Certainty about distributional effects of trade issues and actors' behavior	Trade politics types
High → Society-centered	High → Strategic	Pressure politics
Low → State-centered	High → Strategic	Executive politics
High → Society centered	Low → Rule-guided	Civil politics
Low → State-centered	Low → Rule-guided	Deliberative politics

A pressure politics type of trade politics is to be expected when the political salience of the issue is high and when there is a high degree of certainty about the distributional effects of alternative choices available to actors;

An executive type of trade politics is to be expected when the political salience of the issue is low when there as high degree of certainty about the distributional effects of alternative choices available to actors;

A civil politics type of trade politics is to be expected when the political salience of the issue is high and when there is a low degree of certainty about the distributional effects of alternative choices available to actors;

A deliberative type trade politics is to be expected when the political salience of the issue is low and there is a low degree of certainty about the distributional effects of alternative choices available to actors.

Two questions require some discussion before proceeding with the empirical analysis. First, the above theoretical framework sets out the hypotheses that changing patterns of trade politics in the EU can be understood as a

function of the characteristics of the issue at stake in negotiations. While this analytical perspective does not grasp specific institutional-led cause-effect relationships, the advantage is that it allows to shed some light on the dynamics that underlie variation in patterns of trade politics *within* states when there is no significant institutional variation. It should be noted, however, that institutions are not completely out of the picture. The theoretical framework suggests that domestic institutions can play a fundamental role in shaping actors' preference. For instance, the argument posits that when issues are not politically salient and do not have certain distributional effects values, ideas and cognitive frames embedded in the EU's institutional system can indeed play a key role in trade politics, affecting how policy makers come to define their preferences. In essence, I do not dispute that institutions may affect actors' preferences and their interactions, but rather seek to identify the conditions under which they have an effect. In other words, domestic institutions are somehow subsumed into the framework as dependent variables.

A second question concerns possible problems of correlation between the two independent variables. At first glance, one might argue that whether an issue entails concentrated distributional effects influences the degree of certainty with which the actors can calculate the distributive effects of policy options available to them. A closer look at this problem, however, reveals however that concerns of internal correlation among independent variables are unwarranted. First, costs and benefits of a policy choice need not be concentrated for the actors to be able to assess what distributive effects such choice entails for them. Trade-related assistance to third countries, for instance, has dispersed distributional effects for societal actors within donor countries. Indeed, the costs of these projects are incurred by tax-payers as these funds are allocated through the central government budget. At the same time, actors can clearly quantify the exact amount of resources that are allocated (or foreseen to be allocated) through these projects. Second, domestic actors can anticipate that a given choice will entail concentrated distributional effects for them and yet have difficulties anticipating with precision what these consequences will be. It has been convincingly demonstrated that while lowering foreign barriers to trade may lead exporters to reasonably anticipate the attainment of substantial concentrated gains, international competition creates high uncertainty about the exact amount and the distribution of such benefits (Dür 2010). This also applies to import-competing producers. The example concerning the debate on whether to allow for imports of genetically modified crops in the European market, for instance, illustrates well that while European farmers clearly anticipated that opening up European gates to foreign grown Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) might entail substantial concentrated distributive effects, it was very difficult to anticipate and weigh against each other the likely short term costs and the potential long-term benefits of

such choice (Anderson and Jackson 2006). In sum, whether a given policy entails highly concentrated distributive effects is neither a necessary, nor a sufficient condition for actors involved in the policy making process to be able to calculate such distributive effects with a high degree of certainty.

4. The European Union in the Doha round: four instances of trade politics

The following empirical analysis tests the plausibility of the argument developed drawing on evidence concerning EU trade politics dynamics in the context of four areas of the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations: agriculture, competition, environment and trade-assistance and capacity building. Consistently with the logic of factor-centric analysis, these cases have been selected on the basis of my independent variables (Gschwend and Schimmelfennig 2007). As argued above already, there is no significant variation in EU decision making rules in WTO negotiations across issue areas. Analyzing different instances of EU trade politics within this negotiating setting thus allows me to keep constant, and thus control for an important potential institutional source of variation of observed patterns of trade politics.

4.1. Pressure politics in agriculture negotiations

Agricultural negotiations are a case of high political salience and high certainty for the EU. Agricultural trade liberalization entails substantial concentrated costs for European farmers and these farmers can easily quantify the impact on their welfare of various proposals for reduction of tariffs and support schemes. My theoretical framework suggests that these conditions should bring about a pressure politics type of trade politics. The following empirical analysis lends plausibility to such expectation.

One of the cornerstones in the final deal worked out by the major players during negotiations for the adoption of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) was the so-called peace clause encapsulated in Art. 13. The peace clause granted immunity to countries against which legal action could be initiated on the basis of the provisions of Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) until December 2003. The expiration of the peace clause was a matter of great concern for European farmers and policy-makers (Poletti 2010). Indeed, the expiration of the peace clause would open up the possibility for many EU policy instruments to be challenged under WTO rules thereby putting a large amount of support provided to European farmers through Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) at risk (Steinberg and Josling 2003).

Highlighting the vulnerability to WTO legal challenges of EU agricultural domestic support schemes is important to show the consistency of a pressure politics hypothesis in light of two factors that could at first glance be taken as a proof that policy-makers in the EU were able to pursue autonomous preferences. First, while comprehensive and multilateral negotiations are expected to be opposed by import-competing groups because they increase the ability of policy-makers to overcome domestic pressures for protection (Davis 2004), the EU has consistently supported the idea that such setting offered the best prospect of reaching a deal on further liberalization of agricultural trade in the run-up to the Doha round. Second, the EU has taken a fairly liberalizing stance in negotiations, including substantial offers on market access and domestic support as well as a commitment of highly symbolic relevance such as the willingness to phase out its export subsidies by 2013.

However, a closer inspection of politics dynamics in the EU suggests that these developments are perfectly consistent with a pressure politics view of EU trade policy making. Under conditions of legal vulnerability, multilateral and comprehensive negotiations become appealing to import-competing groups because they offer a number of opportunities to minimize the adjustment costs that litigation would likely entail: delay to an indefinite future these adjustment costs, transform legally vulnerable policies into WTO-consistent ones and facilitate trade-off deals to minimize concessions in the vulnerable sector (Poletti 2010). Indeed empirical evidence shows European farmers consistently supported comprehensive negotiations (COPA-COGECA 1999; 2001). Moreover, EU official positions impressively reflected demands voiced by European farmers in the run-up to the adoption of Doha declaration (for an overview see Poletti 2012). It should come as no surprise then that European farmers explicitly supported the Commission's negotiating approach in Doha and were strongly satisfied with what the EU obtained (Agra Europe 2001).

The analysis of the evolution of the EU's negotiating strategy further corroborates the pressure politics hypothesis. In June 2003 a reform of CAP was decided with a view, amongst other things, to immunize European farmers from WTO legal challenges (Fischler 2003). Indeed the reform transformed the largest shared of legally vulnerable domestic support – namely blue box payments – into WTO-legal support by decoupling most of these payments from production requirements. At the same time, the reform only marginally decreased the support provided to European farmers (OECD 2007), explaining why the huge opposition to previous CAP reforms was not similarly voiced on this occasion by EU farm unions (Swinnen 2008). As requested by European farmers the reform became the bottom line of the EU's negotiating position (Mandelson 2005). Without decreasing support to farmers and immunizing most of domestic support schemes from WTO legal challenges, the

EU was in a position to oppose any agreement that would entail additional costs for European farmers.

Subsequent developments in negotiations corroborate claim that, in line with requests of European farmers organizations, the parameters of an eventual compromise had been already identified by the EU in substantial concessions on topics on which it was legally vulnerable, i.e. domestic support, while resisting substantial concessions on market access. An analysis of the last document that sets the limits of a potential compromise of agricultural negotiations, the Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture of December 2008, makes this point clear (WTO 2008). The figures concerning domestic support – 70% reduction of AMS and 80% reduction of overall trade distorting support – show that none of the offers put forward by the EU were not to represent a binding constraint on the new CAP (Kutas 2006). On market access, the EU had de facto emptied much of the liberalizing potential of its bold offers on tariff cuts, i.e. average tariff cut by 54%, by coupling its offer with the request that large share of tariff lines could be designated as «sensitive», i.e. 4% of tariff lines.

The May 2004 decision by the EU to agree on a phasing out of its agricultural export subsidies during negotiations is also consistent with a pressure politics view of trade politics in this area of negotiations. Indeed, export subsidies remained highly vulnerable to WTO legal challenges and it was thus rational to try and play this card in the negotiating game to get something in exchange rather than be forced to dismantle this instrument as a result of WTO legal rulings (Poletti 2010). In support of this view, it is worth noting that COPA-COGECA defined the July 2004 Agreement that ratified the decision on export subsidies as a framework that allows European agriculture to be safeguarded and as a solid basis for the continuation of WTO agricultural talks (Agra Europe 2004).

In sum, the above evidence lends plausibility to the claim that politically salient issues, entailing certain distributive implications generate a pressure politics type of EU trade politics. This argument can be made even stronger by assessing the explanatory power of potential alternative accounts. The EU strategy could also be explained by relying on an executive politics view, suggesting that such strategy was either shaped by the European Commission's willingness to move the EU in free-trade oriented direction, or driven by the Commission desire not to lose credibility by causing a breakdown of negotiations. Yet, had WTO partners reached an agreement on the last proposal put forward by the EU, the EU's agricultural sector would not have suffered from a substantial reduction of the level of protection provided, neither in terms of direct payments nor in terms of market protection. It is also unlikely that the fear of losing credibility represented a major driving factor behind the EU's policy stance because, as the collapse of negotiations in July 2006 demonstrates,

the EU was ready to stick to its position when it felt vital economic interests were being threatened by the prospective agreement.

In principle it would also be possible to interpret the EU strategy relying on a deliberative politics view, pointing at role of ideas and value-based motivations of policy-makers such as global justice, legitimacy of global governance or equitable distribution of economic gains. However, the EU seemed little preoccupied with these values when it refused to make substantial offers on market access, the area accounting for the overwhelming majority of potential gains for developing countries (Anderson and Martin 2005).

4.2. Deliberative politics in trade-and-competition negotiations

Trade-and-competition negotiations have been selected as a case of low political salience and low certainty because competition negotiations are not salient to the mass public, entail no concentrated distributive effects for any particular business sector and it is difficult to anticipate the consequences of alternative choices available. The following empirical analysis largely confirms my expectations under such conditions, namely that a deliberative politics type to trade politics will characterize trade policy making.

The EU has been at the forefront in suggesting that competition policy be brought into step with trade liberalization, seeking the adoption of binding multilateral competition rules in the WTO (Damro 2004). Already in 1992, former External Affairs Commissioner Brittan launched the idea of including a competition policy regime in the WTO (Brittan 1992). This concept was further restated and clarified on different occasions by Commission officials, stressing the need for a WTO agreement on competition rules, for reinforced cooperation procedures, and for effective enforcement measures (Van Miert 1998; Brittan 1999). The incorporation of competition policy issues in the WTO's binding dispute settlement mechanism represented the most distinctive element of the proposal.

This position contrasted with that of countries such as the US which opposed negotiations on competition policy in the WTO framework and preferred non-binding, voluntary and bilateral mechanisms for cooperation (Damro 2004). Competition policy was ultimately included in the Doha Declaration. The compromise represented a middle ground between EU and US positions: the need for a multilateral framework to enhance the contribution of competition policy to international trade and development was recognized but an eventual agreement would not be subject to the binding dispute settlement mechanism. In the end, the US completely withheld support for this negotiations and the EU acquiesced on dropping the «Singapore issues» off the agenda.

A convincing explanation for the EU strategy in these negotiations can be provided by stressing the role played by ideas and belief systems embedded in the EU institutional system and how these influenced European policy-makers. Fox (1997) and Damro (2006) convincingly argue that ideas embedded in the EU's institutional system, informed by the experience of market integration in the EU, acted as road maps guiding decision makers under conditions of uncertainty with respect to both their preferences and the expected consequences of their actions. In other words, the EC internal market model embodied the concepts to which EU negotiators resorted when to defining their response to the competition challenges brought about by growing international economic interdependence. EU domestic competition policy was developed on the basis of two overarching principles: anti-competitive practices could only be dealt with by conceiving of trade and competition law as strongly interrelated and by delegating enforcement competences to DG Competition, acting under the threat of judicial review by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). According to this view then the WTO was chosen as the best forum to address similar challenges at the international level because it ensured the integration of trade and competition objectives as well as strong enforcement of rules. Official documents and speeches of EU policy makers clearly support this claim (see Poletti 2012). In this sources two things are consistently stressed. First, that the EU's own experience with the internal market project indeed informed the EU strategy. Second, that the WTO framework would best serve the purpose of replicating the success of such experience by ensuring the incorporation of competition provisions in trade law and the enforcement of such provisions (Brittan 1999). My interview with a Commission official further supports this argument,

One of the most important success stories of the European integration project is that which regards the articles on competition. If this particular model worked so well for the European market, we thought, why not exporting it at the global level. In the end one seeks to sell his own successful experience (Interview with DG Trade Official, Brussels, 22 February 2009).

The plausibility of the above argument can be further enhanced by assessing alternative explanations. Empirical evidence clearly shows that the EU position was not shaped by pressure politics. It has been convincingly shown that organizations representing European producers with skepticism the Commission's plan for competition negotiations in the WTO framework and strongly argued against the idea of subjecting such an agreement to the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (Poletti 2012). Other types of societal support were also lacking, showing the implausibility of a civil politics type of explanation for this strategy. Consumer groups did not mobilize on this issue.

The European Commission, and in particular its Directorate-General (DG) competition, was repeatedly accused by anti-globalist movements and development NGOs of following a strongly liberal and anti-interventionist strategy in its competition enforcement, serving the interests of business only (Lee and Morand 2003). Moreover, at the time the EU had first set out its views on these matters experts, there was no such thing as a trade-and-environment epistemic community. Practitioners and scholars were divided on the best recipe to address the negative international spill-overs of heterogeneous national competitions policies (Anderson and Holmes 2002).

Empirical evidence and counter-factual reasoning illustrates why an executive politics view of EU trade policy making in this area is also implausible. Such strategy did not respond to undisputed criteria of economic rationality as a binding WTO agreement on competition policy might elicit a race to the bottom dynamics and create an unstable environment for international business by raising the politicization of international competition disputes (Tarullo 2000). Such strategy also did not serve the bureaucratic self-interest of policy makers as EU competition regulators (DG Competition) opposed the inclusion of a binding dimension to a competition agreement and DG Trade officials would have gained little from a the pooling of competences to the dispute settlement body of the WTO (Damro 2006).

4.3. Civil politics in trade-and-environment negotiations

Negotiations concerning the so-called trade-and-environment agenda have been selected as a case of high political salience and low certainty. Since the mid-1990s environmental issues rank very high in European public opinion priorities and issues related to food and health safety have further contributed to making environmental issues a key concern for European voters. Yet, this is an issue area by high uncertainty regarding the distributive implications of alternative policy scenarios as well as scientific and legal uncertainty. Consistently with my expectations, the following analysis shows that EU trade policy making resembled a civil politics type of trade politics.

Between 1995 – when a Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) was established in the WTO – and 1998, the EU supported only timidly the idea of an inclusion of environmental concerns in the multilateral trading regime. In this period, the position of most WTO members, including the EU, was more about protecting trade concerns from potential environmental incursions than about integrating environmental concerns into trade law (Shaffer 2001). Starting in 1998, however, trade-and-environment became a key component of the strategy with which the EU came to approach the Doha round. From then on, the EU started to fervently advocate inclusion of

environmental windows in the WTO. More specifically, starting in 1999 the Commission defined the two following priorities: confirmation that WTO rules and trade measures taken pursuant to Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) are separate but equal bodies of international law and that latter should not be subordinate to the former, and incorporation of the precautionary principle in WTO thus recognizing the right of WTO Members to take precautionary action to protect human health, safety and the environment (Poletti 2012). In Doha, neither the US nor developing countries backed EU. In the end, the compromise reached significantly narrowed down the scope of negotiations with respect to what proposed by the EU. Further attempts by the EU to revisit the issue by proposing to create a carve out for collective preferences, i.e. environmental and food safety issues, in the WTO also failed to meet WTO partners' agreement.

A number of factors suggest that a civil politics type of trade politics well describes how the EU came to define its position on this issue. Since the early 1990s, the potential risks of biotechnology application to agriculture and food production have been a source of disquiet for European by Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (ENGOS) and broader publics. This general trend was given a boost in 1996 as a result of a series of events such as the so-called «mad cow» disease and the arrival on European soil of the first shipment of GM crops from the US (Pollack and Shaffer 2009). In response to such mounting health, consumer safety and environmental concerns in Europe, in 1998 the EU adopted several directives and regulations covering the issues of authorization, labeling and traceability of GMOs, starting to impose a *de facto* moratorium on the production and importation of food products that may contain GMOs (Falkner 2007).

In 1998 the US threatened to take legal action in the WTO against the EU's regulatory regime on GMOs on grounds of incompatibility with provisions of the WTO agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards regarding the application of the precautionary principle contained in the (Kelemen 2010). The hormone-treated beef WTO dispute with which the US had successfully challenged the EU domestic food safety regulatory framework had shown that such threat might have sufficient ground for success and thus led to serious preoccupations about the effects of legal challenges on domestic environmental and health and consumer safety. Moreover, while the EU had taken the lead in the ongoing talks for an international protocol to protect biodiversity and to regulate the trans-boundary movement of living modified organisms, the so-called Cartagena Protocol on Biodiversity, the US was not part of the agreement and thus retained the right to initiate legal challenges on this matters in the WTO (Eckersely 2004).

A wide range of societal groups thus mobilized asking for new rules to guarantee that WTO would grant deference to international environmental

and national health laws. This is the case of transnational ENGOs, but also national ENGOs and a few vocal farmers organizations, particularly in France and Italy. This mobilization strategy succeeded in forcing policy-makers at the member state and EU levels to take action in the WTO. A comparison of EU proposals and ENGOs documents show striking similarities (Poletti and Sicurelli 2012). Both the timing and the content of EU proposals on WTO discussions regarding trade-and-environment thus suggest that the EU strategy was largely molded by these value-based societal pressures.

Similar dynamics can be observed in the subsequent phase of negotiations. In May 2003 the US administration finally filed a complaint to the WTO, arguing that the EU's moratorium constituted a violation of the SPS agreement. Under pressure from ENGOs and small farmer groups, the European Commission took a number of significant steps to shield domestic consumer and health safety regulations from WTO legal challenges. At the September 2003 WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun, the EU delegation tried to «forge an agreement incorporating environmental protection into WTO rules», with a focus on «the precautionary principle and clear labelling laws» (Euractiv 2004). Most importantly, in September 2004 Pascal Lamy (2004) argued in favour of new WTO rules to allow for its members to derogate to WTO obligations in case of a clash with domestic policies that reflect values that are strongly rooted in a given community, listing environmental protection, food safety and precautions in the field of biotechnology among Europe's collective preferences. These negotiating positions were clearly in line with demands voiced by organized societal groups seeking to uphold the values of environmental and consumer safety protection.

The above argument is further corroborated when assessed against potentially alternative explanations. Pressure politics types of explanations do not find support in empirical evidence. The EU strategy was explicitly opposed by traditional business groups such as Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederation in Europe and by the European Association of Bio Industries (Falkner 2007). European farmers also cannot be considered the a driving factor behind this strategy. These producers were and still are divided on the issue of the use of biotechnology in agriculture, taking a timid stance in favor of health consumer protection more out of the need to respond to consumers' concerns than as a result of a well-defined, interest-based approach (Interview at COPA-COGECA, 16 June 2010). Moreover, when Lamy tried to bring the issue of risk precaution back in the Doha agenda in 2004, he was responsive to the strong mobilization of ENGOs rather than to producers pressures. Indeed, by that time pro-GMO farmers had become more vocal in Europe and COPA-COGECA had started to take a more pragmatic approach on the question of the use of GM crops in the European market (Interview at COPA-COGECA, 16 June 2010).

Executive politics-based accounts do not seem plausible either. The EU position can hardly be described as an attempt by policy makers to autonomously pursue economically efficient policies. While the agricultural sector might have incurred some costs in the short term as a result of the phasing out of existing restrictions on foreign grown GMOs in the short term, concerns have been raised that the EU might be missing the boat of a potential new farming revolution (Tiberghien 2009). Finally, values and ideas held by policy-makers also seem to have little explanatory power. The Commission was internally highly divided on this issue and before 1999 had only timidly advocated the «trade-and-environment» agenda in the WTO (Shaffer 2001).

In sum, empirical evidence lends support to the view that societal pressures for upholding the values of environmental protection in the WTO largely defined the EU strategy in this area of negotiations. Pascal Lamy explicitly acknowledged this by stating «the fact that the nexus between trade and the environment, which had been debated for many years in both GATT and WTO, was finally elevated to a “negotiating” stage in Doha is in large part due to civil society» (WTO 2007).

4.4. Executive politics in technical assistance and capacity building negotiations

Finally, I investigate negotiations on technical assistance and capacity building (TACB) as a case of low political salience and high certainty. These negotiations neither are politically salient for the general public, nor entail concentrated distributional implications for European producers. Yet, the distributional effects of alternative policy scenarios are clear and quantifiable as these negotiations concern activities to be funded through national and EU-level budget allocations. Again, my expectations seem to hold against empirical evidence as an executive politics type of trade politics well portrays EU trade policy-making in these negotiations.

Beginning with the adoption of the Uruguay Round, discussions about TACB have become an integral part of the discourse on how to make the international trading system more responsive to developing countries' needs. Predictably, TACB discussions became an important component of the Doha round negotiations.

The European Union has come to play a crucial role in this context. As the leading advocate of both comprehensive negotiations and of a marked developmental rhetoric in the Doha round, the EU took a seemingly constructive stance on this issue. The 1999 Commission Communication outlining the EU's approach for the new round, for instance, it is claimed that TACB should be integrated in the new round to reinforce regulatory capacity in connection

with the creation of disciplines in new areas (European Commission 1999, 19-20). Moreover, the Commission had spent 700 million Euro in trade-related technical assistance over the 1996-2000 period (European Commission 2003a). It has also been reported that upon arrival in Doha, Trade Commissioner Lamy had offered some developing countries a total of 50 million (Euro) in aid to meet their WTO commitments. In sum, in approaching the new round, the EU sought to convince its WTO partners, particularly developing countries, that it supported the view that new efforts on their part were going to be accompanied by a commitment to address their capacity constraints and did so by incorporating this principles into its broad negotiating platform.

In the end, TACB activities became part of the negotiating mandate set out in the Doha Declaration. Six paragraphs of such declaration sketched out WTO commitments on TACB. Yet, the only concrete commitment was embodied in Paragraph 41, which instructed the Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration to develop a plan to be adopted by the General Council to ensure long-term funding for WTO technical assistance (WTO 2001a). In the immediate aftermath of the Doha Ministerial meeting developed WTO governments sought to demonstrate their good will in this negotiating area by establishing, in December 2001, the so-called Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund. A few months later, the fund received pledges for around 21.5 million Swiss francs (US 15.7 million), more than double the amount anticipated. The Commission and EU Member States were the largest donors by pledging funds worth some 63 % of total contributions (European Commission 2002). Since then, the Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund has been financed with an annual budget of around 24 million Swiss francs, with EU member states and the European Commission contributing to two thirds of its total funding (European Commission 2008).

Empirical evidence illustrates why an executive type of trade politics well describes the way in which the EU shaped its strategy in this field of negotiations. TACB activities may serve two purposes: donor-driven or recipient-driven ones. Even if donor-driven technical assistance does not directly conflict with a developing country's interests, in a world of limited resources, technical assistance in one area can divert human and material resources from others that may be of greater priority (Shaffer 2005). An analysis of the content of EU proposals in this area of negotiations shows «altruistic» motivations were hardly the driving factor behind the EU strategy. In 2001, for example, TACB for the so-called «new issues», represented over 50 percent of TACB spending for trade policy and regulation (23 % trade and competition, 17 % trade facilitation, 3 % trade and investment, 8 % trade and environment) whereas TACB devoted to agricultural issues, undisputedly the single major developmental priority for poor countries, was only 1 % (Oxford Policy Management 2003). In this context, the EU earmarked its contributions to WTO-administered

TACB activities for work related to the Singapore issues (Deere 2005), a set of issues that developing countries did not even want to be included in the Doha Agenda. Similarly, the bulk of the funding pledged for the Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund, more than half of which had been pledged by the EU, ended up being devoted to TACB activities on the «Singapore issues» and trade-environment (Jawara 2003). At the 2003 WTO Ministerial in Cancun the largest share of the 1048 TACB priorities communicated by Members to the WTO Secretariat again focused on the «Singapore issues», mostly because of the EU's lobbying (ICTSD 2003).

When the «Singapore issues» were finally dropped off the Doha agenda in July 2004, EU representatives started to question the future of EU funding for TACB activities and argued that WTO secretariat should assume a more proactive and strategic role in assisting those members that have difficulties in identifying their technical assistance needs (Shaffer 2005). The design and delivery of TACB activities was also biased. It has been convincingly argued that legal and technical advice provided through WTO-led TACB often devoted too little attention to ensuring developing countries know how to exploit options that could help them to accommodate public policy and development objectives (Deere 2005).

The timing with which the EU presented its proposals further corroborates the above argument. The offered a US 50 million TACB program for developing countries only a few months before the beginning of negotiation in Doha. With a similar tactic, Trade Commissioner Lamy announced the launch of a 50 million dollars trade assistance program for African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, in July 2003, two months prior the delicate WTO ministerial to be held in Cancun where EU negotiators knew the «Singapore issues» were going to be attacked by developing countries. While this initiative was taken outside the WTO context, it was clearly aimed at buying-out ACP countries' support for its negotiating platform in the Doha round (Jalawara 2003).

Further support to the view that the EU strategy mostly served policy-makers interests in the broader negotiation game is provided by looking at the positions of societal groups on the issue. Consistently with the theoretical expectations set out above, an issue characterized by low political salience such as TACB elicited no societal mobilization. Unsurprisingly, this issue is not mentioned in official documents of organizations representing either European business groups or consumer groups.

5. Conclusion

This article aims to make sense of the empirically complex reality of EU trade politics in multilateral trade negotiations. Its central message is that trade

policies determine trade politics. The political salience of an issue affects patterns of societal mobilization, which in turn influence decision-makers' room of maneuver. Whether the effects of prospective policies can be anticipated influences the logic of action of the actors involved in the trade policy-making process, hence how they behave and interact. The empirical analysis strongly supports the claim that these two simple hypotheses can help us making sense of the different ways in which the EU decided over different trade policies in the Doha round.

While this argument is tested against evidence concerning the EU's role in the Doha round, its implications may shed light on future development in the EU trade policy at large. The main purpose behind the choice of concentrating on policy, rather than institutional variables, was to account for observable variation of EU trade politics when significant variation along institutional variables, i.e. domestic decision making rules, is absent. My argument could thus also be applied to changing patterns of EU trade politics in the context of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). The last attempt to revive the Doha round in 2011 has again failed and the EU has joined its major trading partners on the path of regionalism, seeking to pursue both its tariff and regulatory trade objectives through PTAs. The argument developed in this article suggests that variation of EU trade politics will be less marked in these settings than in multilateral trade negotiations. On the one hand, one can expect negotiations regarding PTAs to be characterized by higher degree of certainty about the distributional effects of prospective agreements. Because these agreements are inherently discriminatory, providing for legitimate exceptions to the most-favored nation clause, producers can anticipate with more certainty whether and to what extent they will capitalize on increased market access opportunities. In addition, since these agreements target a limited number of countries, producers that trade with such countries can anticipate more easily whether trade liberalization measures will affect them. Overall, these elements suggest that strategic behavior, rather than rule-guided behavior, should be the dominant logic driving EU actors behavior in PTAs. On the other hand, PTAs negotiations tend to be less visible to the mass public, do not involve discussion regarding «constitutional» issues for the international trade regime, and entail less severe distributional effects for domestic producers. These elements suggest a lower degree of political salience and, in turn, greater latitude and autonomy for EU policy makers.

References

- Agra Europe (2001), *Global satisfaction over new round*, No.1978, November 16.
- Anderson, K. and W. Martin (2005), *Agricultural trade reform and the Doha development agenda*, in «The World Economy», 28, 9, pp. 1301-27.
- Anderson, R.D. and P. Holmes (2002), *Competition policy and the future of the multilateral trading system*, in «Journal of International Economic Law», 5, 2, pp. 531-563.
- Brittan, L. (1992), *A framework for international competition*, Speech at the World Competition Forum, Davos, 3 February.
- Brittan, L. (1999), *The need for a multilateral framework of competition rules*, in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Trade and competition policies: exploring the ways forward*, Paris, OECD Publications, pp. 29-36.
- Checkel, J. (2001a), *Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change*, in «International Organization», 55, 3, pp. 553-588.
- Checkel, J. (2001b), *A constructivist research program in EU studies?*, in «European Union Politics», 2, 2, pp. 219-249.
- COPA-COGECA (2005), *European farmers: WTO agreement is incomplete and one-sided*, CDP(05)99-1-SM December.
- COPA-COGECA (2006), *European farm leaders meet with Commissioner Mandelson to demand: no more EU concessions in WTO*, July 18.
- Damro, C. (2004), *Multilateral competition policy and transatlantic compromise*, in «European Foreign Affairs Review», 9, 2, pp. 269-287.
- Damro, C. (2006), *The new trade politics and EU competition policy: shopping for convergence and cooperation*, in «Journal of European Public Policy», 13, 6, pp. 867-886.
- Daugbjerg, C. and A. Swinbank, (2008), *Curbing exceptionalism: the EU response to external challenge*, in «The World Economy», 31, 5, pp. 631-652.
- Davis, C. (2004), *International institutions and issue linkage: building support for agricultural trade liberalization*, in «American Political Science Review», 98, 1, pp. 153-168.
- De Bièvre, D. (2006), *The EU regulatory trade agenda and the quest for WTO enforcement*, in «Journal of European Public Policy», 13, 6, pp. 847-62.
- De Bièvre, D. and A. Dür (2005), *Constituency interests and delegation in European and American trade policy*, in «Comparative Political Studies», 38, 10, pp. 1271-96.
- Deere, C. (2005), *International Trade technical assistance and capacity building*, Occasional Paper, UNDP.
- Drake, W.J. and K. Nicolaidis (1992), *Ideas, interests and institutionalization: trade in services and the Uruguay Round*, in «International Organization», 46, 1, pp. 37-100.
- Dür A (2010), *Protection for Exporters: Power and Discrimination in Transatlantic Trade Relations, 1930-2010*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Dür, A. (2006), *Assessing the EU's role in international trade negotiations*, in «European Political Science», 5, 4, pp. 362-376.
- Dür, A. (2008), *Bringing economic interests back into the study of EU trade policy-making*, in «British Journal of Politics and International Relations», 10, 1, pp. 27-45.
- Dür, A. and D. De Bièvre (2007), *Inclusion without Influence: NGOs in European Trade Policy*, in «Journal of Public Policy», 27, 1, pp. 79-101.
- Eckersley, R. (2004), *The big chill: the WTO and multilateral environmental agreements*, in «Global Environmental Politics», 4, 2, pp. 24-50.
- Eckhardt, J. (2011), *Firm lobbying and EU trade policy making: reflections on the anti-dumping case against Chinese and Vietnamese shoes*, in «Journal of World Trade», 45, 5, pp. 965-991.

- Euractiv (2004), *Sustainable trade*, 23 March, available at: <<http://www.euractiv.com/en/social/europe/sustainable-trade/article-117546>>.
- European Commission (1999), *Communication from the Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament: The EU approach to the Millennium Round*, COM (99) 331 final, 8 July.
- European Commission (2003), *Trade and development: a priority for the Round*, July.
- European Commission (2008), *EU supports capacity building for developing countries in the WTO*, Brussels, 12 March.
- Falke, A. (2005), *EU-USA Trade Relations in the Doha Development Round: Market Access versus a Post-Modern Trade Policy Agenda*, in «European Foreign Affairs Review», 10, pp. 339-357.
- Falkner, R. (2007), *The political economy of normative power Europe: EU environmental leadership in international biotechnology regulation*, in «Journal of European Public Policy», 14, 4, pp. 507-526.
- Finnemore, M. and K. Sikkink, (1998), *International norm dynamics and political change*, in «International Organization», 52, 4, pp. 887-917.
- Fischler, F. (2003), *The new, reformed agricultural policy*, Speech 03/326, Luxembourg, 26 June.
- Fox, E.M. (1997), *The world antitrust and market access*, in «The American Journal of International Law», 91, 1, pp. 1-25.
- Frieden J (1991), *Invested interests: the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance*, in «International Organization», 45, 4, pp. 425-51.
- Gerlach, C. (2006), *Does business really run EU trade policy? Observations about EU trade policy lobbying*, in «Politics», 26, 3, pp. 176-183.
- Gilligan, M.J. (1997), *Empowering exporters: reciprocity, delegation and collective action in American trade policy*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.
- Goldstein, J. (1988), *Ideas, Institutions and American Trade Policy*, in «International Organization», 42, 1, pp. 179-217.
- Goldstein, J. and L. Martin (2000), *Legalization, trade liberalization and domestic politics: a cautionary note*, in «International Organization», 54, 3, pp. 603-32.
- Goldstein, J. and R. Keohane (1993), *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
- Gschwend, T. and F. Schimmelfenning (2007), *Research design in political science*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Haas, P.M. (1992), *Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination*, in «International Organization», 46, 1, pp. 1-35.
- Hix, S. (1999), *The political system of the European Union*, New York, Palgrave.
- ICTSD (2003), *Technical assistance and capacity building*, Doha Round Briefing Series 2, 6.
- Jawara, F. (2003), *The cunning bully: EU bribery and arm-twisting at the WTO*, Corporate Europe Observatory.
- Jupille, J., A. Caporaso and J. Checkel (2003), *Integrating institutions: constructivism and the study of the European Union*, in «Comparative Political Studies», 36, 1-2, pp. 7-40.
- Kelemen, D. (2010), *Globalizing European Union Environmental Policy*, in «Journal of European Public Policy», 17, 3, pp. 335-49.
- Kerremans, B. and J. Orbie, (2009), *The social dimension of European Union trade policies*, in «European Foreign Affairs Review», 14, 5, pp. 629-641.

- Kutas, G. (2006), *EU negotiating room in domestic support after the 2003 CAP reform and enlargement*, Working Paper, Institute for International Trade Negotiations.
- Lamy, P. (2004), *The emergence of collective preferences in international trade: implications for regulating globalisation*. Available at: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/september/tradoc_118929.pdf>.
- Lee, M. and C. Morand (2003), *Competition policy in the WTO and FTAA: a trojan horse for international trade negotiations?* Ottawa, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives.
- Lowi T. (1972), *Four systems of policy, politics and choice*, in «Public Administration Review», 32, 4, pp. 298-310.
- Mahoney, C. (2007), *Lobbying success in the United States and the European Union*, in «Journal of Public Policy», 27, 1, pp. 35-56.
- Makombe, P.F. (2003), *Editorial comment: who benefits from technical assistance and capacity building*, in «Southern and Eastern African Trade, Information and Negotiations Institute Bulletin», 6, 5.
- Mandelson, P. (2005), *Doha round negotiations and the Commission mandate*. Available at: <www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_5151_en.htm>.
- March, J.G. and J.P. Olsen (1998), *The institutional dynamics of international political orders*, in «International Organization», 52, 4, pp. 943-969.
- March, J.R. and J.P. Olsen (1989), *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*, New York, Free Press.
- Meunier, S. (2005), *Trading voices: the European Union in international commercial negotiations*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- Meunier, S. and K. Nicolaïdis (2006), *The European Union as a conflicted trade power*, in «Journal of European Public Policy», 13, 6, pp. 906-925.
- Milner, H.V. (1988), *Resisting protectionism*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- Niemann, A. (2004), *Between communicative action and strategic action: the Article 113 Committee and the negotiations of the WTO basic Telecommunications Services Agreement*, in «Journal of European Public Policy», 11, 3, pp. 379-407.
- Oatley, T. (2009), *International political economy: interests and institutions in the global economy*, Pearson.
- OECD (2007), *Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries*, Paris, OECD Publications.
- Olson, M. (1965), *The logic of collective action*, Cambridge, Ma, Harvard University Press.
- Oxford Policy Management (2003), *A vision for the future of technical assistance in the international development system*, Client Report, 1 July.
- Peterson, J. and E. Bomberg (1999), *Decision-making in the European Union*, Basingstoke, Macmillan.
- Poletti, A. (2010), *Drowning protection in the multilateral bath: WTO judicialisation and European agriculture in the Doha round*, in «British Journal of Politics and International Relations», 12, 4, pp. 615-633.
- Poletti, A. (2012), *The European Union and Multilateral Trade Governance: the Politics of the Doha Round*, London, Routledge.
- Poletti, A. and D. De Bièvre (2013), *The political science of EU trade policy: a literature review with a research outlook*, in «Comparative European Politics», forthcoming.
- Poletti, A. and D. Sicurelli (2012), *The EU as a promoter of environmental norms in the WTO*, in «West European Politics», 34, 4, pp. 911-932.
- Pollack, M.A. and G. Shaffer (2009), *When Cooperation Fails: The International Law and Politics of Genetically Modified Food*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

- Richardson, J. (2001), *European Union: power and policy-making*, 2nd ed., London, Routledge.
- Risse, T. (2000), *Let's Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics*, in «International Organization», 54, 1, pp. 1-39.
- Rogowski, R. (1987), *Trade and the variety of democratic institutions*, in «International Organization», 41, 2, pp. 203-24.
- Schattschneider, E. (1935), *Politics, pressures and the tariff*, New York, Prentice Hall.
- Shaffer, G. (2001), *The World Trade Organization under challenge: democracy and the law and politics of the WTO's treatment of trade and environment matters*, in «Harvard International Law Review», 25, 1, pp. 1-93.
- Shaffer, G. (2005), *Can WTO technical assistance and capacity building serve developing countries?* Available at: <http://works.bepress.com/gregory_shaffer/5>.
- Smith, M. (2001), *The European Union's commercial policy: between coherence and fragmentation*, in «Journal of European Public Policy», 8, 5, pp. 787-802.
- Steinberg, R. and T. Josling (2003), *When the peace ends: the vulnerability of EC and US agricultural subsidies to WTO legal challenge*, in «Journal of International Economic Law», 6, 2, pp. 369-417.
- Swinnen, J. (2008), *The Perfect Storm: the Political Economy of the Fischler Reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy*, Brussels, CEPS.
- Tarullo, D.K. (2000), *Norms and institutions in global competition policy*, in «The American Journal of International Law», 94, 3, pp. 478-504.
- Tiberghien, Y. (2009), *Competitive governance and the quest for legitimacy in the EU: the battle over the regulation of GMOs since the mid-1990s*, in «Journal of European Integration», 31, 3, pp. 389-407.
- Ugur, M. (1998), *Explaining protectionism and liberalization in the European union trade policy: the case of textiles and clothing*, in «Journal of European Public Policy», 5, 4, pp. 652-670.
- Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederation in Europe (1999) *Trade and competition: WTO framework on competition rules*. 6/30/1, 14 May.
- Van den Hoven, A. (2004), *Assuming leadership in multilateral economic institutions: the EU's development round discourse and strategy*, in «West European Politics», 27, 2, pp. 256-283.
- Van Miert, K. (1998), *Globalization of competition: the need for global governance*. Available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp1998_052_en.html>.
- Verdier, D. (1994) *Democracy and international trade*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- Wilson, J.Q. (1973), *Political organizations*, New York, Basic Books.
- Woll, C. (2006), *Trade Policy Lobbying in the European Union: Who Captures Whom?*, Paris Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, Working Paper 06/7.
- Woolcock S (2010), *The Treaty of Lisbon and the European Union as an actor in international trade*, Working paper 1/2010: ECIPE.
- WTO (2007), *Lamy: civil society is influencing the WTO agenda*. Available at: <www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl73_e.htm>.
- WTO (2008), *Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture*, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4.
- Yee, A.S. (2004), *Cross-national concepts in supranational governance: state-society relations and EU policymaking*, in «Governance», 17, 4, pp. 487-524.
- Young, A. (2007), *Trade Politics Ain't What It Used to Be: The European Union in the Doha Round*, in «Journal of Common Market Studies», 45, 4, pp. 789-811.

- Young, A. and J. Peterson (2006), *The EU and the new trade politics*, in «Journal of European Public Policy», 13, 6, pp. 795-814.
- Young, O. (1989), *The politics of international regime formation: managing natural resources and the environment*, in «International Organization», 3, 3, pp. 349-375.